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The Effects of Cooperation: 
A Structural Model of Siblings’ Caregiving Interactions
* 
 
This paper analyzes the decision making process of adult children to provide informal care to 
their parents. First, we develop a structural model to explain the amount of time that only 
children (without siblings) spend on providing care, taking into account opportunity costs in 
terms of time and money. The model is estimated using two datasets from 12 European 
countries and reveals the preferences of adult children for consumption, leisure and informal 
care. Although we assume that differences in behavior between children with and without 
siblings are due to dissimilar constraints only, by using only children we do not have to make 
assumptions about interactions between siblings in the structural model. In the presence of 
siblings, their choices also play a role in the caregiving decision. A central question is 
whether siblings make cooperative or noncooperative decisions. The second part of this 
paper aims to establish whether interactions between siblings are cooperative or 
noncooperative, by comparing predicted cooperative and noncooperative outcomes with 
observed outcomes. We use the structural parameter estimates from the first part of the 
paper and model the noncooperative outcomes using a Quantal Response Equilibrium. The 
results suggest that the nature of the interactions between siblings has a strong effect on the 
division of informal care between siblings. For almost three quarters of the families the 
noncooperative model has a better fit than the cooperative model. When the noncooperative 
families can be pushed into their cooperative outcome, their parents would on average 
receive 50% more informal care per week from their children, but this would reduce full-time 
labor supply by 5.7%-points and increase part-time labor supply by 6.7%. 
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When parents age, their adult children usually face deteriorating parental health and an in-
creased need for care. For the children, the question arises how to balance the goal of appro-
priately caring for parents with other goals in life, such as work and own family. Governments,
on the other hand, face the challenge how to reconcile the conﬂicting goals of encouraging the
provision of care for the elderly by families, and encouraging (female) participation in the labor
market.
A prerequisite for designing eﬀective policies in this area is to understand the complex
decision making process at the level of individual families. The outcome of the decision making
process depends on a large number of factors, including the labor market potential and the own
family situation of each adult child in the family, the availability of formal care, the distances
between the parental home and each child’s home and the health status of the parents. An
additional important factor that has received only scant attention in the literature is the nature
of the interactions between siblings, in particular whether it can be characterized as cooperative
or non-cooperative.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze this complex process by developing a structural
model in which adult children allocate their time to work, leisure, and care simultaneously. Our
ﬁrst contribution to the literature is that we estimate a structural model for children without
siblings (only children), to learn about the preferences of adult children for informal care,
without having to make assumptions about the nature of interactions between siblings. Thus
our maintained assumption is that diﬀerences in behavior between children with and without
siblings are due to dissimilar constraints only. In the model, preferences are characterized by a
utility function deﬁned over consumption, leisure, and the amount of care that parents receive
from their children. Children face a time constraint and a budget constraint, which depend on
the (potential) wage in the labor market, and the time and monetary costs of traveling to the
parental home. As far as we know, this is the ﬁrst study that extracts preferences with regard to
informal care using only children, such that the results are not aﬀected by interactions between
siblings. Only Kotlikoﬀ and Morris (1990) explicitly consider only children, but they analyze
the living arrangement of an only child and a single parent. This study, instead, focuses on care
arrangements, taking living arrangements as given.1
1There are some studies that model both care and living arrangements, e.g. Hoerger et al. (1996) and Pezzin
and Schone (1999).
3Our second contribution to the literature is a ﬁrst attempt to assess the nature of the
interactions between siblings and investigate the potential welfare gains of cooperation between
siblings. In the literature siblings are often ignored in the decision making process, or included
only as an explanatory variable. However, as noted, among others, by Checkovich and Stern
(2002) caregiving decisions among siblings are not independent and allowing for simultaneous
decision making among siblings improves our understanding of caregiving decisions. The next
question that arises is how these family decisions take place. Some studies that consider siblings
assume that decisions are made noncooperatively (Hiedemann and Stern, 1999; Byrne et al.,
2009; Callegaro and Pasini, 2008; Fontaine et al., 2009), while others assume a two-stage decision
process in which siblings (1) decide whether to participate in caregiving or not, and (2) those
who participate in caregiving make a cooperative care decision (Engers and Stern, 2002). This
study computes cooperative as well as noncooperative equilibria between siblings using the
estimated preference parameters from the structural model, and compares these equilibria to
the observed outcomes found in the data. To do this, we have to make some assumptions.
First, as mentioned before, siblings are assumed to have the same preferences as only children
with regard to leisure, consumption, and the amount of informal care received by the parent.
Secondly, we assume that own informal care and informal care provided by a sibling are perfect
substitutes. Finally, we assume that siblings have their own time and budget constraints and
that there are no ﬁnancial transfers between siblings.
We bring the model to the data using the ﬁrst two waves of the Survey of Health, Ageing
and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). SHARE includes information on the distances between
the parental and adult children’s homes, labor market participation, the household situation of
adult children and their parents, and the amount of time spent on caring for parents. Sources
of identiﬁcation of the econometric model include shocks in the health condition of parents
between the two SHARE waves, and variation in characteristics and outcomes between waves
and between adult children. SHARE does not contain wage and income data of the adult
children. Therefore, we use the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions
(EU-SILC) as additional data to impute wage rates and other household income for the adult
children.
The results show that for 71% of the siblings the noncooperative model has a better ﬁt than
the cooperative model. If it is possible to push these families into their cooperative equilibrium
the amount of informal care can be increased, but this would reduce labor supply.
4The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses relevant literature on informal care giving.
In section 3 we specify the structural model and explain the estimation strategy. Section 4
discusses the data , after which section 5 presents the estimation results. Section 6 considers
the nature of the interactions between siblings (cooperative and noncooperative equilibria) and
investigates the potential welfare gains of cooperation. Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature Review
In the economic, demographic, sociological, and psychological literature on the elderly, consid-
erable attention has been paid to the degree to which children support their (elderly) parents.
Support itself is usually distinguished into instrumental support on the one hand, and social and
emotional support on the other hand (Hogan and Eggebeen, 1995; Silverstein and Bengtson,
1997). This study focuses on instrumental support, which includes practical help to parents
(e.g., running errands, doing household work), help with personal care (e.g., washing, bathing,
caring for when sick) and help with paperwork. Research shows that children often provide
practical help to their parents. Even at later ages, however, parents in Europe more often help
children than children help parents (Kohli, 1999). Hence, there hardly is a reversal of the ﬂow
of practical support exchange as parents age.
Another category of instrumental support is ﬁnancial support. Financial support to parents
is rarely given by children in western societies, except among immigrants. Bonsang (2007)
found that only 2.6% of adult children in European countries provide ﬁnancial assistance to
their parents. In non-western societies, it is more common and often more obligatory that
adult children ﬁnancially support their parents (Frankenberg et al., 2002; Lee et al., 1994).
Financial support from parents to children is more common. However, these ﬁnancial transfers
are mainly to children following further education or less well oﬀ children, such as those who are
unemployed. As these motivations are not directly related to informal care giving, this study
does not take ﬁnancial transfers explicitly into account.
In the empirical economic literature we ﬁnd reduced form models and structural models
investigating (1) the extent to which informal care and formal care are complements or sub-
stitutes, (2) the factors that determine the provision of informal care, and (3) the dependence
between informal care giving and labor supply.
If informal and formal care are substitutes, informal care can reduce home health care use
and delay nursing home entry. Only then, governmental long term care expenditures can be
reduced and labor shortages in the (long term) health care sector can be reduced, by increasing
5informal care. Bolin et al. (2008a) and Bonsang (2009) investigated this issue in European
countries and found that informal care is a substitute for long term care, at least as long as the
needs of the elderly are low and require unskilled type of care. For the U.S. Van Houtven and
Norton (2004) also conclude that informal care and formal care are substitutes. On the other
hand, the introduction of free formal personal care in Scotland in 2002 did not seem to have
reduced informal care (Bell et al., 2006).
The models in the literature focus on a large number of potential determinants. Theoret-
ically, these determinants can be distinguished into demand and supply variables. Demand
variables are characteristics of parents which indicate the degree to which parents ‘need’ sup-
port from their children, such as a parent’s health status, and whether the parent is living with
a partner (Grundy, 2005; Klein Ikkink et al., 1999; Silverstein, 1995; Spitze and Logan, 1989).
Living with a partner is related to less need for support by children, because the partner is the
prime source of giving support to an elderly person (Dykstra, 1993).
Supply variables have to do with the child’s costs and beneﬁts of giving support. Research
shows that there is variation among societies in the degree to which children respond to the
need of their parents, with children in individualistic countries like Sweden and the Netherlands
being less responsive (Kalmijn and Saraceno, 2008). We will therefore include country speciﬁc
dummy variables to allow the preferences for informal care to diﬀer across countries.
An important supply variable is time costs. Giving support and paying a visit are time
intensive, especially if support also requires traveling, which usually is the case. There are also
ﬁnancial costs involved, but there is little evidence that the child’s income situation aﬀects
contact or support (Klein Ikkink et al., 1999; Waite and Harrison, 1992). There are social
status gradients in contact and support, but these have more to do with education and less
with ﬁnancial aspects of social status (Kalmijn and Dykstra, 2006).
The time budget of an adult child depends on whether the child has own children living in
the home. Several authors have hypothesized that caring for one’s own children competes with
the support children give to their elderly parents. This phenomenon has been referred to as the
‘sandwich generation’. There is indeed some evidence that the support daughters give to parents
is negatively aﬀected by having children (Klein Ikkink et al., 1999), but there is also evidence for
a null eﬀect (Eggebeen and Hogan, 1990). A complication is that having own children may also
increase contact levels with the parent due to the grandparenting role (Kalmijn and Dykstra,
2006). This may be a reason why there are no consistent eﬀects of having children on support.
Employment also aﬀects children’s time budget, and the opportunity costs of labor may
6inﬂuence the informal care decision. Several studies have investigated the relation between em-
ployment and informal care using diﬀerent datasets and methods to correct for the potential en-
dogeneity bias (caregivers may have diﬀerent (unobserved) characteristics than non-caregivers,
which inﬂuence both informal care and labor market decisions). The results are mixed. Wolf
and Soldo (1994) ﬁnd no evidence of reduced propensities to be employed, or of reduced condi-
tional hours of work, due to the provision informal care. Others ﬁnd that informal care reduces
employment signiﬁcantly among European men and women (Bolin et al., 2008b), and among
U.S. women (Ettner, 1996). Ettner (1995) and Heitmueller and Michaud (2006) ﬁnd that care-
giving for coresidential parents reduces employment. As in Pezzin and Schone (1997, 1999),
Byrne et al. (2009), and Callegaro and Pasini (2008) we will model the labor force decision and
informal care decision jointly in a structural model. The results are important for understand-
ing the conﬂict between women’s increasing economic role in society on the one hand, and the
increasing need for informal support to the elderly on the other hand (Kohli, 1999).
A ﬁnal determinant of informal care has to do with family size and family interactions.
The number of siblings in a family may have diﬀerent eﬀects. First, parents will need less
help of each individual child when they have more children. In addition, children may shirk
their responsibilities if there are many siblings who can do the work, such that the amount of
informal care given by a sibling may depend negatively on the care of another sibling. On the
other hand, in case of a strategic bequest motive (described by Bernheim and Summers, 1985),
the amount of care given by a sibling depends positively on the care given by the other siblings.
However, more recent studies do not support the bequest motive (Sloan et al., 1997; Perozek,
1998; Callegaro and Pasini, 2008). It has been found that siblings are each other’s substitutes.
The more siblings a child has, the less often the child visits the parent and the less often he or
she gives support to the parent (Kalmijn, 2007; Kalmijn and Saraceno, 2008; Spitze and Logan,
1991). In addition to the number of siblings, the nature of the interactions between siblings
play a role in informal care decisions. In the literature we do not ﬁnd evidence about whether
siblings behave cooperatively or noncooperatively. This study tries to establish the behavior
of siblings using the preference parameters of only children which are obtained in a structural
model.
3 Structural Model
This section describes the structural model we use to estimate the amount of time only children
spend on providing informal care to their parents taking into account the key supply and demand
7factors discussed in the previous section. Section 3.1 deals with the speciﬁcation of the model
and describes the estimation strategy. Section 3.2 explains how we impute wage rates and other
household income in the model, because SHARE contains no information about the wage rates
and other household income of the adult children. We use a wage equation to impute wage
rates and an income equation to impute remaining household income for the adult children in
SHARE.
3.1 Model speciﬁcation
We specify a structural model to explain the amount of time an adult child spends on paid
work, care for parents, and other activities. In this study all activities other than paid work
and care for parents are called leisure. As in Van Soest (1995), we formulate the model as
a discrete choice problem. In this discrete choice problem adult children can choose between
diﬀerent combinations of labor, informal care, and leisure, which also lead to diﬀerent levels of
consumption. With regard to labor we distinguish full-time employment, part-time employment,
and no employment.2 In the model fulltime employment is set to 36 hours of labor per week
and part-time employment to 18 hours of labor per week. Concerning informal care we consider
the choice to give no substantial amount of informal care, providing informal care between 1
and 4 hours a week on average (50% of the informal care givers), between 4 and 8 hours a week
(20%) and providing more than 8 hours informal care a week (30% of the informal care givers).
In case no substantial amount of informal care is given, the hours of informal care in the model
is set to zero.3 For the second informal care category (1-4 hours) we set the number of hours
of informal care in the model to be 2 (the average) and the number of visits to one per week,
for the second category (4-8 hours) the number of hours is six (the average) and visits are on a
daily basis4. In the last category (>8 hours per week) we set the number of hours of informal
care to be 185 and we assume that the parents are visited on a daily basis, which is also the
median number of visits in this category. In total we thus have a choice set of 12 alternatives
(3 labor market categories × 4 informal care categories).
The child derives utility from leisure (tl), consumption (c), and the amount of informal care
2These are the three categories available in the data.
3In the data there are 134 observations giving informal care between 0 and 1 hour per week. Most of them
give less than 0.25 hours of informal care per week. These people fall in the category ‘no substantial informal
care’.
4The median number of visits in the 4-8 category is also seven per week.
5This is the median number of hours of informal care in the ‘> 8’ category. The average number of hours of
informal care in this category is 29, but this is due to some individuals giving a very high number of hours of
informal care.
8his parents receive (ts). We use the following quadratic utility function
U(t) = t′At + t′b, (1)
where t = (tl,c,ts)′ , A is a symmetric 3 × 3 matrix with entries αij(i,j = 1,2,3) and b =
(bl,bc,bs)′. For the model to be economically rational, the marginal utility of consumption must
be positive; see e.g. Van Soest and Stancanelli (2010). We will check whether this condition is
satisﬁed in its estimated version. The marginal utility of informal care may be negative.6 We
maximize the utility function subject to a time and budget constraint. The time and budget
constraints are speciﬁed as
tl + th + ts + (τd)K = T
c + Kpdd = wth +   (2)
where
th = labor time (hours)
K = number of visits (per week)
d = distance to parent (return trip, km)
τ = travel time per kilometer (hours)
T = total time (# hours in one week)
pd = travel costs (per kilometer)
w = wage (per hour)
  = remaining household income
The time endowment T is 168 hours per week. Remaining household income ( ) includes
all income that is not earned by the adult child under consideration. It includes capital income,
social transfers, and labor income of the partner (if present). We abstract from the fact that
labor market choices of the adult children under consideration and their partners may be de-
termined simultaneously. Furthermore, we assume wage rates7 and the geographical distance
6Estimates of Byrne et al. (2009) show that adult children care about their parents’ health quality, suggesting
that altruism may play an important role in the provision of informal care. However, they also show that
informal care provision tends to be burdensome, which may explain why few family members provide care for
elderly individuals.
7Bolin et al. (2008b) found no statistically signiﬁcant wage-rate eﬀects of informal care provision in Europe.
9between adult children and their parents to be exogenous.8
To take into account preference variation across adult children, the vectors in b are functions
of observed and unobserved characteristics of the adult children and their parents9
bl = Xlβl + ul
bc = Xcβc + uc
bs = Xsβs + us.
(3)
Xl and Xc contain characteristics which are likely to inﬂuence the amount of leisure time and
consumption the adult child prefers, such as the age, gender, education, number of children,
and marital status of the adult child. Xs includes variables inﬂuencing the preference for giving
informal care to parents, namely the health position of the parents, whether both parents are
alive and the gender of the parent when the parent is single, the (average) age of the parents,
the gender of the child, country speciﬁc dummy variables, and the number of children of the
adult child. Also education is included in the matrix Xs, because higher educated children
may have diﬀerent value orientations (Kalmijn, 2006). Random preferences due to unobserved
characteristics are incorporated through the terms ul, uc, and us. They capture time invariant
unobserved heterogeneity. For example, us may capture the three motives that are, in addition
to observed characteristics, important in explaining social support: reciprocity, altruism, and
norms of responsibility.10 We assume u = (ul,uc,us) to be distributed jointly normal with mean





























In addition, we introduce random disturbances to the utilities of the twelve choice opportunities
in the same way as in the multinomial logit model
Uj = U(tl,c,ts) + ǫj j = 1,...,12
ǫj ∼ EV (I) j = 1,...,12 ǫ1,...,ǫ12 independent
(5)
8Charles and Sevak (2005) tested whether children’s location endogenously responds to parent’s health but
found no evidence of this.
9While we adopt a speciﬁc parametric form for the utility function, preferences are identiﬁed nonparametrically.
In general, preferences are not fully identiﬁed in a model that disaggregates nonlabor time use since each nonlabor
time use category has the same price, the wage rate (Hicks aggregate commodity theorem). However, in our case
the price of informal care exceeds the price of pure leisure because of travel costs. Moreover, the price ratio varies
across families as wages and distances to parents vary.
10These three motives are investigated in the sociological literature (e.g. Kohli and K¨ unemund, 2003, and
Kalmijn, 2010). Kalmijn (2010) found that altruism is relatively important for parents to support their children,
however, for adult children, reciprocity and norms of responsibility appear to be relatively more important.
10leading to the familiar logit choice probabilities






Substituting the utility function (1) and the time and budget constraint (2), equation (6)
becomes










where tj = (tlj,cj,tsj) and tlj and cj are deﬁned by
tlj =T − thj − tsj − (τd)Kj
cj =wthj +   − Kjpdd. (8)
Equation (7) presents the probability that a certain combination of (tl,c,ts) is chosen, given
observed and unobserved characteristics. The disturbances ǫj can be interpreted as optimization
errors: adult children choose a combination of (tl,c,ts) that is close to optimal, rather than
always fully optimal. This may be due to errors in the perception of the utilities of the set
of alternatives. In contrast, the random eﬀects (ul,uc,us) are known by the adult child (but
unobserved to the researcher). We estimate the model parameters using maximum likelihood.









P(Uj > Uk for all k  = j|X,d,w, ,u)p(u)du,
(9)
where p(u) is the density of vector u. The three dimensional integral can be approximated using
simulations (simulated maximum likelihood). Using R simulations, the likelihood contribution






P(Uj > Uk for all k  = j|X,d,w, ,ur), (10)
where the draws ur,r = 1...R are from a trivariate normal distribution with mean zero and
variance Σu. Most of the adult children are observed two times (wave 1 and wave 2). The
likelihood contribution of an adult child who is observed in both waves, and chooses alternative






P(Uj1 > Uk1 for all k  = j|X1,d1,w1, 1,ur)
∗ P(Uh2 > Uk2 for all k  = h|X2,d2,w2, 2,ur), (11)
so that the unobserved characteristics are the same in both waves.
A draw ur can be obtained by taking 3 (pseudo-random) draws from a standard normal
distribution (let’s call them θ = (θl,θc,θs)′) and then calculate (ur
l,ur
c,ur
s)′ = Lθ. Here, L is
the Choleski factor of Σu (the unique lower triangular matrix such that LL′ = Σu).11
Integrals can be approximated with fewer draws (R) when using Halton draws instead of
pseudo-random draws. This is because Halton sequences provide more coverage of the density
which has to be integrated. For more information about the derivation of Halton sequences see
for example Train (2003), or Drukker and Gates (2006), who discuss the advantages of Halton
sequences when using simulations to approximate integrals numerically.
3.2 Modeling wage rates and remaining household income
In SHARE wage rates (w) and remaining household income ( ) of the adult children are un-
known, therefore we use predictions from a wage equation12 and an equation for remaining
household income. Both equations are estimated using the ‘European Union Statistics on In-
come and Living Conditions’ (EU-SILC).
In EU-SILC we can only observe wages for workers. However, the working population
is probably not a random subsample from the population as people with comparatively high
wages (conditional on, for example, their education level) are more likely to work. There
may be unobservables that inﬂuence the decision to participate, as well as the wage rate. A
commonly used method to deal with this sample selection is the method by Heckman (1979).
Heckman takes selection bias into account by adding an equation which models the participation
decision, and allowing for nonzero correlation between the wage and the participation equation.








′ = Σu (Train, 2003).
12We assume wage rates to be independent of the provision of informal care. This is consistent with the results
of Bolin et al. (2008b), who did not ﬁnd any statistically signiﬁcant wage-rate eﬀects of informal care provision.
12We estimate the following Heckman model, for each country separately
ln(w∗
i) = Xwiβw + vwi (12a)
p∗
i = Xpiβp + vpi (12b)
wi = w∗
i if p∗
i > 0 (12c)
wi = 0 if p∗
i ≤ 0 (12d)
where (12a) is the wage equation and (12b) is the (probit type) participation equation. Xwi
and Xpi contain personal characteristics such as age, gender, and the education level. Generally
an exclusion restriction is required to generate credible estimates from the Heckman selection
model. Therefore, we include dummy variables for having children in the participation equation,


















and we estimate the parameters using FIML. As for a probit model, the normalization σ2
p = 1
is used since only the sign of p∗
i is observed. For remaining household income ( ) we also
estimate an equation using a standard OLS regression, for each country and for men and women
separately
ln( i) = Xµiβµ + vµi, (14)
where Xµi contains personal characteristics such as age, marital status, and the education level.
In the structural model, introduced in section 3.1, we take into account that wage rates
and remaining household income are predicted with error. Using the estimated variances of the
errors in the wage equations and the remaining household income equations (σ2
w and σ2
µ) we
integrate the prediction errors out. Van Soest (1995) also uses estimated standard deviations
of the errors in the wage equation to account for prediction errors.
When we take into account prediction errors, the likelihood contribution in equation (9) of
an individual who chooses alternative j becomes
L(α,β,Σu|X,d,βw,σw,βµ,σµ)
=
      +∞
−∞
P(Uj > Uk for all k  = j|X,d,w, ,u)p(u)p(w)p( )dudwd .
(15)












and vr is a draw from the normal distribution with variance σ2
w. In the same way




µ is a draw from the normal distribution with variance σ2
µ.
For most countries the estimates of σwp in the EU-SILC data are not signiﬁcant, which
indicates that selection with regard to unobservables is not very important. We therefore do
not take into account correlations between vw, vµ and the unobserved characteristics (ul,uc,us).
4 Data
This section describes the data we use to estimate the parameters of the model. Section 4.1
describes the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) and section 4.2 the
‘European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions’ (EU-SILC).
4.1 SHARE
SHARE is a multidisciplinary database of microdata on health, socio-economic status and so-
cial and family networks of individuals aged 50 and older in Europe. Data were collected in
2004/2005 (wave 1) and 2006/2007 (wave 2) by face-to-face computer-aided personal interviews
(CAPI), plus a self-completion drop-oﬀ part with questions that command more privacy. This
study uses 13 countries that have contributed data to SHARE. They represent various regions
in Europe, ranging from Scandinavia (Denmark and Sweden) through Central Europe (Aus-
tria, France, Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands) to the Mediterranean (Spain, Italy and
Greece). In the second wave two ‘new’ EU member states have contributed data to SHARE
(Czech Republic and Poland). Other countries available in SHARE that we do not use in this
study are Israel and Ireland. We do not use these countries because they are not represented
in the EU-SILC data, which we describe in the next section.
There are several papers using SHARE to study informal care giving. Most of these studies
use the respondents as providers of informal care (e.g. Bonsang, 2007, 2009, and Bolin et al.,
2008a,b). This study considers the respondents in their role as (the potential) receiver of
informal care. Crespo and Mira (2010) call this the ‘parents-sample’ as the respondents are the
elderly parents. The reason for using the ‘parents-sample’ is that we need information on all
14siblings within a family. The respondents (in our case ‘the parents’) give information about all
their children that are still alive (sex, year of birth, geographical distance between the children
and their parents, education, marital status, number of children, the employment status of
the children, and the amount of informal care they receive from their children). If we would
consider the respondents as the providers of informal care, there would be no information on the
amount of care the siblings of the respondents give to their parents. The health situation of the
parents provides a measure for the amount of care parents need. SHARE provides a lot of health
related variables, such as self-reported health, limitations in activities of daily living (ADL and
IADL), mental health, diagnosed chronic conditions, whether people are suﬀering from several
symptoms and limitations in functioning (e.g. measures by grip strength and walking speed).
In this study, however, we use self-reported health which has the lowest number of missings.
The parents are asked to rate their health on a ﬁve-point scale, ranging from very good to very
poor (wave 1) or from excellent to poor (wave 2).
We select all respondents with one or two adult children. Furthermore, our interest is on
children who are 40 years or older, as these children are most likely to be involved in personal
care for their elderly parents. Following McGarry (1999), Bonsang (2007), and Norton and
Van Houtven (2006) we omit households where children are living in the same household as the
respondent, because there is no detailed information on informal care giving within households.
For the same reason we exclude respondents where grand-children, siblings, and other non-
relatives are living in the same household as the respondent. Families with one or two self-
employed adult children are excluded, because we have no information about the number of
hours that self-employed people work. Also families where one or both children have the daily
activity ‘sick’ are excluded, as they may not be able to give informal care. After excluding
respondents for whom key information is missing, we end up with 2253 respondents with one
adult child and 2891 respondents with two adult children.
Table 1 shows the amount of informal care and the number of adult children per country.
Informal care includes practical household help (e.g. household chores, shopping and home
repairs), personal care (e.g. dressing, bathing, eating) and help with paperwork. Adults report
whether their children help them on an almost daily basis, weekly, monthly or less often. Fur-
thermore, they were asked to give an estimate of the number of hours of informal care received
on a typical day, week, month or year. We transform these answers to a variable measuring the
average amount of informal care that adults receive from their children per week. We deﬁne
people to be involved in informal care when they give one hour or more informal care per week.
15In Germany, Greece, Czechia and Poland a lot of people are involved in informal care giving
(more than 15% of the only children and siblings). Conditional on being involved in informal
care, children in Mediterranean countries give relatively many hours of informal care, whereas
the children in Denmark, The Netherlands, and Sweden give a relatively small number of hours
of informal care. When we compare only children and siblings, we ﬁnd that in general only
children are more often involved in informal care giving than siblings and that they also provide
more hours of informal care. This suggests that the hours of care provided by a sibling are a
substitute for someone’s own informal care.
Table 1: Informal care per countrya
Country only child % informal # hrs 1 sibling % informal # hrs
care care
Austria 218 14.7 15.9 438 12.3 6.9
Germany 294 19.0 17.3 572 15.0 6.3
Sweden 217 10.6 7.1 674 7.6 5.9
Netherlands 115 7.8 3.0 442 4.3 4.8
Spain 99 13.1 17.2 308 9.7 19.5
Italy 167 12.0 18.4 338 8.6 12.8
France 263 14.1 10.0 508 9.6 6.2
Denmark 134 11.2 4.5 512 6.3 6.8
Greece 213 19.7 17.1 804 19.5 12.5
Belgium 318 20.1 5.8 528 8.1 10.8
Czechia 165 24.2 11.8 450 29.6 10.7
Poland 50 16.0 16.5 208 16.8 5.1
Total 2253 15.9 12.2 5782 12.4 9.5
a Percentage of children involved in informal care and the number of hours of informal
care, conditional on giving any informal care, per country.
Table 2 presents information about informal care giving and the geographical distances
between children and their parents. The higher the distance between children and their parents,
the higher the traveling time and costs, and the lower the fraction of people involved in informal
care. It appears that the distribution of only children and siblings among the categories is about
the same (so that only children do in general not live closer or further away from their parents
than siblings).
16Table 2: Distance and informal carea
Distance only child % inf. # hrs 1 sibling % inf. # hours
care care
same building 9.8 29.0 15.7 7.1 31.0 12.4
≤ 1 kilometer 17.2 20.7 11.0 15.3 19.1 12.3
1-5 kilometers 18.8 19.9 8.1 21.0 15.9 8.3
5-25 kilometers 25.6 15.9 13.1 23.2 10.5 6.3
25-100 kilometers 12.6 9.9 13.3 15.3 6.8 5.7
100-500 kilometers 10.0 4.4 24.3 11.1 3.6 6.5
≥ 500 kilometers 3.0 0.0 - 3.3 1.1 86.0
≥ 500 kilometers 3.0 1.5 1.9 3.7 1.4 1.4
and another country
Total 100 15.9 12.2 100 12.4 9.5
a Percentage of children involved in informal care and the number of hours of informal
care, conditional on giving any informal care, per distance category.
Table 3: Health and informal carea
Health only child % inf. # hrs 1 sibling % inf. # hours
care care
Father, good / very good 8.7 6.1 4.5 7.7 6.3 13.5
Father, fair 4.9 19.8 9.6 5.9 12.4 5.0
Father, poor 2.4 34.0 15.9 2.3 23.5 8.4
Mother, good / very good 21.3 16.4 7.6 22.8 12.2 7.1
Mother, fair 17.8 24.2 9.8 15.0 19.5 10.1
Mother, poor 8.5 33.3 22 7.1 26.5 12.1
Both poor, or poor and fair 5.0 20.5 23.3 5.3 21.8 14.6
Both fair, or fair and good 15.6 6.5 7.2 17.5 5.9 7.9
Both good / very good 12.4 2.5 7.1 13.0 3.1 3.8
Father poor, mother good 1.7 12.8 2.9 1.7 10.4 5.6
Father good, mother poor 1.6 25.0 11.8 1.8 18.3 11.1
Total 100 15.9 12.2 100 12.4 9.5
a Percentage of children involved in informal care and the number of hours of informal care,
conditional on giving any informal care, per health status of the elderly parent. In the ﬁrst
three categories the adult child only has a father, in the fourth to the sixth category the adult
child only has a mother, and in the last ﬁve categories the adult child has a father and a mother.
17As expected, the provision of informal care is higher for children with parents in bad health
than for children with parents in good health (table 3). In the analysis we distinguish single
parents and parents living with a partner, as parents may provide informal care to each other
when they are both alive. It appears that when the mother of a child is in poor health and the
father is in good health there is more informal care from adult children than when the father
is in poor health and the mother is in good health. The reason may be that men in these
generations have less homework skills than women.
Table 4: Daily activity and informal carea
Daily activity only child % informal # hrs 1 sibling % informal # hrs
care care
full-time work 67.2 13.4 8.3 73.6 11.0 7.8
part-time work 8.2 15.2 7.6 8.8 11.2 5.9
unemployed 5.5 17.1 11.0 3.0 16.8 13.2
in education 0.6 7.1 14.0 0.3 0.0 -
parental leave 0.3 0.0 - 0.1 0.0 -
(early) retirement 8.1 31.1 20.4 5.4 26.4 10.9
homemaker 9.2 21.7 21.8 8.1 17.3 18.8
other 0.9 20.0 25.1 0.8 0.0 -
Total 100 15.9 12.2 100 12.4 9.5
a Percentage of children involved in informal care and the number of hours of informal care,
conditional on giving any informal care, per daily activity of the adult child.
Table 4 shows the amount of informal care by the daily activity of the child. It is interesting
to see that the amount of informal care does not diﬀer much between children who are full-time
employed and children who are part-time employed. Children who are (early) retired or are
looking after home are most often involved in informal care. However, note that retired persons
have relatively older parents, who are more often in bad health. Finally, women are more often
involved in informal care than men and often provide more hours of informal care (table 5).
18Table 5: Gendera
Gender only child % informal # hrs 1 sibling % informal # hours
care care
Female 53.8 17.7 14.1 51.9 14.8 9.9
Male 46.2 13.8 9.4 48.1 9.8 8.8
Total 100 15.9 12.2 100 12.4 9.5
a Percentage of children involved in informal care and the number of hours of informal
care, conditional on giving any informal care, per gender of the adult child.
4.2 EU-SILC
The wage equation and the equation for remaining household income, described in section 3.2,
are estimated using EU-SILC data. EU-SILC contains microdata on income, poverty, social
exclusion and living conditions in Europe. It comprises information of surveys and registers
from the EU member states. We select people up to age 76 and omit households who receive
income out of self-employment or who are permanently sick or disabled (just as in SHARE).
Furthermore, we exclude observations which have missings for one or more of the variables in
the model. We end up with 55.100 observations, which are described in table 6.
19Table 6: Descriptives EU-SILC
AT BE CZ DE DK ES FR
Male (%) 49 48 47 46 49 47 48
Age (mean) 45 43 46 47 45 43 43
Primary education (%) 1 14 0 2 0 33 12
Lower secondary education (%) 24 18 19 16 29 22 13
(Upper) secondary education (%) 53 34 69 46 43 21 47
Post secondary non-tertiary education (%) 9 2 1 6 0 1 2
Tertiary education (%) 13 31 12 30 28 23 26
Man with partner (%) 35 32 32 32 38 31 34
Woman with partner (%) 34 35 32 31 37 33 32
Man with child (%) 22 24 17 21 23 24 25
Woman with child (%) 23 26 19 25 25 24 26
Net wage rate (mean) 10 11 2 10 14 8 11
Nonlabor income (mean) 27413 24240 5990 24718 28575 18717 24010
N 1488 1346 1095 6028 1422 7171 3221
GR IT NL PL SE Total
Male (%) 44 47 51 46 50 47
Age (mean) 43 46 45 42 43 44
Primary education (%) 28 27 9 17 9 18
Lower secondary education (%) 13 29 24 7 16 20
(Upper) secondary education (%) 36 32 37 60 42 41
Post secondary non-tertiary education (%) 5 5 3 3 5 4
Tertiary education (%) 19 7 27 13 28 18
Man with partner (%) 28 30 40 30 38 32
Woman with partner (%) 32 32 35 33 37 33
Man with child (%) 22 21 25 27 27 23
Woman with child (%) 25 22 21 31 26 25
Net wage rate (mean) 7 9 12 2 10 9
Nonlabor income (mean) 15475 22161 22036 4835 23742 18709
N 1345 14155 6007 10464 1358 55100
5 Estimation results
This section presents the estimation results of the wage equation, the equation for remaining
household income, and the parameters of the structural model. We start with the estimation
20results of the wage equation and the equation for remaining household income, since these are
needed as input to estimate the parameters of the structural model.
5.1 Wage equation and remaining household income
Wage equations are estimated for every country separately. Table 7 describes the wage equation
of Sweden. The wage equations of all other countries are estimated in a similar way and are
available on request.
Table 7 shows that wage rates increase with age and are signiﬁcantly higher for people with a
high education level. σwp is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, indicating that sample selection
is no signiﬁcant issue. This also holds for most of the other countries. Due to measurement
errors in the wage rates, the standard deviation of the errors in the wage equation may be
overestimated.13
Table 8 shows the estimation results of remaining household income for Sweden. Again, the
equations of the other countries are estimated in a similar way and are available on request.
Remaining household income increases with age. Furthermore, in Sweden remaining household
income is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for diﬀerent education categories. Next, we will use the
wage equations and the equations for remaining household income from EU-SILC to estimate
the parameters of the structural model.
5.2 Estimation results structural model
Table 9 presents the estimation results of the structural model.14 This section ﬁrst describes
the parameter estimates related to the preferences for informal care (ts). With regard to infor-
mal care the results show signiﬁcant decreasing returns to scale (αss is signiﬁcantly negative).
Furthermore, the interaction term αls is signiﬁcantly positive, meaning that when the amount
of informal care is already high, the utility of an extra hour of leisure increases. When par-
ents are in bad health they need more attention and the estimates show that this increases the
preference for informal care. The preference for informal care is highest when a single living
father or mother has a poor health status, when both parents are in poor health, or when
the mother has a poor health condition and the father is in good health. On the other hand,
13A sensitivity analysis, in which we for example multiply σw by 0.8 for all countries, indicates that this does
not inﬂuence the structural estimation results very much.
14Our estimation procedure uses 25 drawings. Estimation is computer intensive. Other studies with these kind
of models have used for example 5 or 10 drawings which produce qualitatively similar results (Van Soest, 1995)
or 10 drawings (Van Soest and Stancanelli, 2010).
21Table 7: Estimation results wage equation Sweden, sample
selection modela




Primary education -0.070 0.109
Lower secondary education -0.057 0.083
(Upper) secondary education 0.000 -
Post secondary non-tertiary education 0.051 0.089
Tertiary education 0.109 0.046
Man with partner 0.073 0.088
Women with partner -0.092 0.082
Intercept 1.458 0.368
Equation 2: participation decision
Man -0.069 0.196
Age 15-29 0.000 -
Age 30-39 1.045 0.157
Age 40-49 1.010 0.143
Age 50-59 1.147 0.166
Age ≥ 60 -1.193 0.155
Primary education -0.351 0.163
Lower secondary education -0.962 0.130
(Upper) secondary education 0.000 -
Post secondary non-tertiary education -0.355 0.194
Tertiary education 0.090 0.117
Man with partner 0.612 0.152
Woman with partner 0.574 0.145
Man with child -0.022 0.144









a The reference individual is a women with (upper) secondary educa-
tion in the age category 15-29. She has no partner and no children.
22Table 8: Estimation results remaining household income, Swedena
ln(remaining household income) Men Women
Coeﬃcient St. error Coeﬃcient St. error
Age -0.097 0.023 -0.040 0.023
Age2 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
Primary education -0.115 0.227 0.051 0.232
Lower secondary education 0.326 0.186 0.185 0.189
(Upper) secondary education 0.000 - 0.000 -
Post secondary non-tertiary education 0.109 0.248 -0.156 0.300
Tertiary education 0.203 0.149 0.028 0.136
Married 0.440 0.163 0.421 0.167
Widowed 0.054 0.453 -0.442 0.341
Divorced -0.658 0.292 -0.676 0.231
Never married 0.000 - 0.000 -
Having a child 0.724 0.138 0.845 0.141
Intercept 10.524 0.454 9.766 0.468
N 655 638
R-squared 0.115 0.116
Adj R-squared 0.101 0.102
σµ 1.466 1.434
a The reference individual is a never married man (left) or woman (right), with (upper) secondary
education and no children.
23when the father is in poor health and the mother has a good health status, the preference for
informal care giving is lower. Presumably, mothers are better able to give informal care to their
spouses than fathers are able to give informal care to the mothers of the adult children. Several
studies ﬁnd that mothers receive more care than fathers (Bonsang 2007; Klein Ikkink et al.
1999; Attias-Donfut et al. 2005). Our results suggest that this depends on the health status
of the parent. Mothers in good health receive more informal care than fathers in good health,
but fathers in bad health receive more informal care than mothers in good health (which is
also as expected, if fathers in the generation under consideration indeed have lower homework
skills). In addition to a bad health status, the preference for informal care increases with the
age of the parent(s). This is in accordance with the literature, indicating that even after ex-
tensively controlling for disability, age remains an important driver of long term care use (De
Meijer et al., 2009). The country speciﬁc dummy variables comprise institutional as well as
cultural diﬀerences between countries. Institutional diﬀerences constitute for example publicly
ﬁnanced long term care programmes,15 and the availability of formal care. Cultural diﬀerences
include diﬀerences in social norms with regard to informal care and the degree to which family
ties are considered to be important. It has been found that southern European countries have
stronger family ties than northern European countries (Reher, 1998). The estimation results
show that the preferences with regard to informal care are relatively high in Greece, Germany,
Belgium, Austria, and Czechia.16 High educated children have signiﬁcantly lower preferences
for informal care than lower educated children. One argument in the literature is that higher
educated children live farther away from their parents due to geographical labor market restric-
tions. However, also after taking into account distance we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of education
on the preference for informal care, which may be explained by diﬀerent value orientations of
the higher educated (Kalmijn, 2006) and/or competing interests (Waite and Harrison, 1992).17
15An overview of publicly ﬁnanced long term care programmes can be found in Bolin et al. (2008b).
16It is remarkable that southern European countries like Italy and Spain do not have signiﬁcantly positive
results here. Probably this has to do with living arrangements. In Italy and Spain many adult care givers are
co-residing with their parents and these households are not included in this analysis.
17Kalmijn (2006) found that face-to-face contact between higher educated children and their parents is relatively
low, even after controlling for distance.
24Table 9: Estimation results structural modela
Coef. Std. err. p-value
αll (t2
l ) -0.00018 0.00019 0.358
αcc (c2) 1.44e-07 2.38e-07 0.546
αss (t2
s) -0.01226 0.00445 0.006
αlc (tl × c) 0.00002 0.00001 0.003
αls (ts × tl) 0.00230 0.00102 0.023
αcs (ts × c) -1.43e-06 0.00002 0.945
βl0 (tl) -0.25464 0.05971 0.000
βl1 (tl× child is man) -0.10354 0.02051 0.000
βl2 (tl× number children) 0.02203 0.00907 0.015
βl3 (tl× man×number children) -0.03900 0.01133 0.001
βl4 (tl× age child) 0.00564 0.00084 0.000
βl5 (tl× child is married) 0.00757 0.01535 0.622
βl6 (tl× child is divorced) -0.01272 0.02226 0.568
βl7 (tl× child is widowed) 0.04751 0.04445 0.285
βl8 (tl× child has low education level) 0.13144 0.03673 0.000
βl9 (tl× child has high education level) -0.03662 0.01288 0.004
βc0 (c) 0.02788 0.00410 0.000
βc1 (tc× child is man) 0.00292 0.00161 0.070
βc2 (tc× number children) -0.00096 0.00087 0.271
βc3 (tc× man×number children) 0.00106 0.00092 0.249
βc4 (tc× age child) -0.00050 0.00007 0.000
βc5 (tc× child is married) 0.00348 0.00133 0.009
βc6 (tc× child is divorced) 0.00355 0.00203 0.080
βc7 (tc× child is widowed) 0.00235 0.00572 0.682
βc8 (tc× child has low education level) 0.00288 0.00483 0.552
βc9 (tc× child has high education level) 0.00320 0.00097 0.001
βs0 (ts) -3.03510 0.31385 0.000
βs1 (ts× child is man) -0.23573 0.11326 0.037
βs2 (ts× number children) 0.03988 0.04162 0.338
βs3 (ts× man×number children) -0.11870 0.05818 0.041
βs4 (ts× father good / very good health) -0.10545 0.18083 0.560
βs5 (ts× father fair health) 0.88709 0.17274 0.000
βs6 (ts× father poor health) 1.11773 0.20649 0.000
a Table continues on the next page.
25Table 9: Estimation results structural model, continueda
Coef. Std. err. p-value
βs7 (ts× mother good / very good health) 0.57372 0.15491 0.000
βs8 (ts× mother fair health) 0.72741 0.14136 0.000
βs9 (ts× mother poor health) 1.06507 0.16237 0.000
βs10 (ts× both poor, or poor and fair health) 1.01035 0.16383 0.000
βs11 (ts× both fair, or fair and good health) 0.43515 0.13891 0.002
βs12 (ts× father poor, mother good health) 0.67826 0.24108 0.005
βs13 (ts× father good, mother poor health) 1.36701 0.22906 0.000
βs14 (ts× Germany) 0.34698 0.12951 0.007
βs15 (ts× Italy) -0.05540 0.14384 0.700
βs16 (ts× Greece) 0.41713 0.12893 0.001
βs17 (ts× Spain) 0.21706 0.14050 0.122
βs18 (ts× France) 0.22165 0.12188 0.069
βs19 (ts× Netherlands) -0.38264 0.18871 0.043
βs20 (ts× Denmark) 0.18658 0.15070 0.216
βs21 (ts× Belgium) 0.34925 0.12576 0.005
βs22 (ts× Austria) 0.27338 0.13071 0.036
βs23 (ts× Poland) -0.30224 0.18413 0.101
βs24 (ts× Czechia) 0.59367 0.15322 0.000
βs25 (ts× (average) age parent - 55) 0.03911 0.00492 0.000
βs26 (ts× child has low education level) 0.36887 0.11600 0.001
βs27 (ts× child has high education level) -0.25675 0.07192 0.000
σ2
l 0.02078 0.00442 0.000
σ2
c 0.00007 0.00001 0.000
σ2
s 1.02037 0.21353 0.000
σlc -0.00121 0.00022 0.000
σls 0.02571 0.00853 0.003
σcs -0.00148 0.00042 0.000
Log likelihood -2814.912
N 2253.000
a The reference individual is a never married female adult child, of whom both parents are alive,
have a good / very good health position, and are living in Sweden.
26Finally, we ﬁnd that women have signiﬁcantly higher preferences for providing informal care
than men.
Secondly, we describe the parameter estimates related to leisure (tl). The preference for
leisure increases with age and is somewhat lower for men than for women. Children increase
women’s preferences for leisure signiﬁcantly, probably because more children often mean more
responsibilities for adult daughters inside their own households (the care for a child also belongs
to ‘leisure time’ in this model). Marital status does not aﬀect adult children’s preferences for
leisure. Married persons spend leisure time with each other, but on the other hand household
production is more eﬃcient for couples than for singles, which saves time.18 Finally, low edu-
cated children have signiﬁcantly higher preferences for leisure, and high educated children have
signiﬁcantly lower preferences for leisure. Maybe, less favorable labor conditions among the
lower educated bring about higher preferences for leisure time rather than labor time.
The parameter estimates related to consumption (c) show that older children have signif-
icantly lower preferences for consumption. In addition, married persons and higher educated
individuals have a relatively high preference for consumption. As mentioned before, for the
model to be economically rational, the marginal utility of consumption must be positive. We
ﬁnd that for all but 18 observations (0.8%) this condition holds. These 18 adult children have
a high age, which leads to a relatively low preference for consumption in the model (as can be
seen from the coeﬃcient βc4).
The ﬁnal part of table 9 shows the estimates of the covariance matrix of the unobserved
heterogeneity terms (equation 4), which are in line with our expectations. All coeﬃcients are
signiﬁcant, indicating that unobserved heterogeneity is important. The negative sign of σlc
indicates that unobserved characteristics which increase the preference for leisure tend to have
a negative eﬀect on the preference for consumption. In the same way, the negative value for σcs
indicates that unobserved characteristics which increase the preference for informal care, have
in general a negative eﬀect on the preference for consumption. Finally, σls shows that if persons
have a relatively high preference for leisure (conditional on the observed characteristics in the
model), they also have on average a somewhat higher preference for informal care.
The relations between wage rates, distances, and informal care follow from the estimated
preference parameters and the time and budget constraint. To facilitate interpretation of the
results, ﬁgure 1 shows the relation between geographical distance and the amount of informal
18Waite and Harrison (1992) found that the presence of a husband decreases the number of visits a woman has
with friends, but does not reduce a woman’s social contacts with kin.
27care given by a reference individual in the model. As a reference individual we consider a
married German women of age 55, with an 80 year old father in poor health, no mother, and 2
children of her own. She has a medium education level, a wage rate of 10 euros per hour and her
remaining household income is 15,000 euros per year. Unobserved heterogeneity is important
regarding the preferences for informal care. Figure 1 therefore shows seven lines. Each line
represents the reference individual with a diﬀerent random eﬀect us. These reﬂect, for example,
diﬀerent levels of family ties, degree of altruism, or feelings of obligation to provide informal
care. The line ‘p50’ shows the relationship between distance and informal care when all random
eﬀects ul,uc and us are equal to zero. This means that the unobserved preferences with regard
to leisure, consumption, and informal care are at the median level. For example, with regard to
informal care we can interpret this reference individual to have ‘median responsibility norms’.
The line ‘p90’ represents the reference individual with high unobserved preferences for informal
care. Only 10% of the individuals have a higher random eﬀect us. The same explanation holds
for the other lines, p10, p25, p60, p70, and p80. For example, for line p25, only 25% of the people
have smaller unobserved preferences for informal care. ul and uc are zero for all lines, such that
the only diﬀerence between the lines is the random eﬀect us, the unobserved heterogeneity with
regard to informal care.
Figure 1: Estimated relationship between distance and the expected supply of informal care to
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Figure 1 shows that the reference person with ‘median’ unobserved preferences for informal
care provides almost no informal care. This is as expected, since we found in table 3 that only
2834% of the only children with a father in bad health provide informal care. The higher the
preference of the reference individual to provide care, the longer it takes before informal care
decreases with distance (distance elasticity is low for persons with high preferences for informal
care).
The distance between adult children and their parents may also inﬂuence the labor force
participation of the adult children. Unsurprisingly, ﬁgure 2 presents that for the majority of
the adult children, who give almost no informal care, distance does not inﬂuence labor force
participation. Focussing on p70, we see that labor supply increases with distance. Apparently,
at least part of the reduction in informal care is replaced by labor. For those with relatively high
preferences for informal care, labor force participation ﬁrst declines when distance increases, as
more travel time is needed for the provision of informal care. However, after a certain distance
(e.g. 50 kilometers for the 80th percentile), informal care decreases and labor force participation
increases.
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Figure 3 and 4 show the relation between the wage rate of the reference individual, the
expected number of hours of participation in the labor market, and the hours of informal
care the reference individual provides to her father. In these ﬁgures the distance between the
reference individual and her father is 7.5 kilometers. The seven lines represent diﬀerent levels of
the unobserved heterogeneity term with regard to informal care, just as explained for ﬁgure 1.
In line with the literature (e.g. Evers et al., 2008), ﬁgure 3 shows a positive wage elasticity of
labor supply. Reference individuals with higher preferences for informal care are less active in
29the labor market. For example, at the wage rate of 10 euros per hour, the reference individual
with a high preference for informal care (p90) participates about 9 hours less on the labor
market than the reference individual with a low unobserved preference for informal care (p10).
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Figure 4: Relationship between wages and the expected supply of informal care to elderly
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According to Figure 4 the wage elasticity of informal care supply is small. The wage elasticity
for a reference individual with large norms of responsibility (or other reasons that lead to a high
30unobserved preference for informal care) is almost zero.
6 Two adult children
In families with two siblings, informal care provision to parents is determined by the character-
istics of both siblings, and the nature of the interaction between siblings. In this section we use
the estimates of the structural model, estimated for only children, to families with two adult
children. When applying the estimates of only children to siblings, some assumptions are re-
quired. First of all, we assume that siblings have the same preferences for leisure, consumption
and informal care as only children. Regarding informal care, this assumption is in line with
Spitze and Logan (1991), who found that children’s closeness to parents and attitudes towards
ﬁlial responsibility is unrelated with being an only child or not. According to their study, dif-
ferences in support between families with diﬀerent numbers of siblings are not attributable to
diﬀerent attitudes or feelings of closeness between these families. Instead, to explain diﬀerences
in support between families of diﬀerent size, they propose that attention should be paid on
how each child adjusts his or her own behavior when more children are potentially available
for contact and support to parents (which corresponds to our assumption). The only diﬀerence
between only children and siblings in our model is that in families with two adult children there
is now a sibling available who can also provide informal care (the hours of informal care ts
in the utility function becomes the sum of own informal care and informal care provided by
the sibling). We assume that own informal care and informal care provided by the sibling are
perfect substitutes. This means that children receive the same direct utility from an hour of
informal care provided by themselves or by their sibling (this utility is βs, from equation 3).
Also, an hour of informal care provided by one of the siblings decreases the marginal utility of
an extra hour of informal care by αss (the same as in the model for only children), it increases
the utility obtained from leisure by αls, and it changes the marginal utility of consumption by
αcs (not signiﬁcant). Only, for those siblings with a negative direct utility from informal care
(βs < 0), we assume that they do not receive any direct utility from an extra hour of informal
care provided by their sibling (these are, for example, individuals with healthy parents and/or
low unobserved preferences for informal care). Finally, we assume that both siblings have their
own time and budget constraints and that there are no ﬁnancial transfers between siblings. The
amount of informal care provided may be the outcome of a noncooperative or cooperative game
between two siblings.
31Section 6.1 describes how we derive noncooperative and cooperative equilibria. Next, we
show some simulations of cooperative and noncooperative behavior between reference siblings
(6.2). Finally, we apply the model estimated in this study to the families with two siblings in
SHARE, to get an indication whether siblings behave cooperatively or noncooperatively, and
to estimate the expected gains from cooperation between siblings (6.3).
6.1 Cooperative and noncooperative equilibria
6.1.1 Noncooperative equilibrium
In the noncooperative equilibrium, we assume that both siblings maximize their utility, given
the choice of their sibling and their own time and budget constraint. We use a generalization of
the Nash equilibrium, based on the assumption that a player’s rationality is bounded. Bounded
rationality is incorporated by adding random disturbance to the payoﬀs of the players, just as we
did for only children in (5). Just as for only children, we assume that siblings are more likely to
choose better strategies than worse strategies, but do not play a best strategy with probability
one (children are “better responders” rather than “best responders”). This concept, in a game-
theoretic framework, has been explained by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, 1998) and is called
the Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE). As we add random errors distributed according
to the type I extreme value distribution, we have a special version of the Quantal Response
Equilibrium, namely the logit equilibrium (LQRE, Anderson et al., 2002). The LQRE extends
the model we estimated for only children to the situation with two or more siblings. In the logit





m = 1,...,12 (19)
where pim is the probability of sibling i choosing alternative m. E(U(ti,m|pj)) is the expected
utility to player i of choosing alternative m when sibling j has probability distribution pj for the
12 alternatives. The time and budget constraints are substituted in the utility function. The
nonnegative parameter λ is inversely related to the level of error and can be interpreted to reﬂect
the degree of bounded rationality. When λ → ∞, players become ‘perfectly rational’ and the
logit equilibrium converges to the Nash equilibrium. In the other extreme case, when λ = 0, the
probabilities of the twelve alternatives converge to 1/12, for both siblings (i.e., siblings make
extremely noisy choices). Unfortunately, the error parameter λ can not be identiﬁed (Haile
et al., 2008). Standard multinomial logit models assume λ = 1 and consistent with the model
32for only children, we also assume λ = 1.19
The logit response functions pi and pj are functions of each other. For example, the prob-
ability of sibling 1 choosing alternative m depends on the probabilities of sibling 2 choosing
the alternatives 1 to 12. On the other hand, the probability of sibling 2 choosing alternative
m depends on the probabilities of sibling 1 choosing the alternatives 1 to 12. We ﬁnd the
logit equilibrium by solving the logit response functions, which form a system of 24 nonlinear
equations that are listed in Appendix 6.2.
6.1.2 Cooperative equilibrium
In the cooperative equilibrium, we assume siblings to maximize the sum of their utilities.
U(t1,t2) = γ U(t1) + (1 − γ) U(t2) γ ∈ [0,1] (20)
subject to their own time and budget constraints. We choose γ = 0.5, which is one choice out
of the large set of Pareto solutions.20
For each of the 12×12 = 144 possible alternatives for the two siblings we compute U(t1,t2),
and we use these utilities to compute the probability of each alternative in the same way as we





l = 1,...,144. (21)
6.2 Simulations
In this section we simulate some noncooperative and cooperative equilibria. For these simu-
lations we stick to our reference person, speciﬁed in section 5.2 (a woman of age 55, who is
married and living in Germany, she has a 80 year old father in poor health, no mother, two
children, a medium education level, a remaining household income of 15,000 euros per year,
and a wage rate of 10 euros per hour). However, in this section our reference person is no only
child anymore. First, we assume that she has a sister, who has exactly the same characteristics
as herself. This sister lives 7.5 kilometers from the parent. The ﬁrst ﬁgure of 5 presents the
19For future research it may be interesting to allow λ to vary with the education levels of the adult children.
20In section 6.3 we do a sensitivity analysis, which shows that the conclusions are not very sensitive to the
choice of the weights. The small diﬀerences can be explained by the fact that characteristics of siblings are often
about the same. The health status and country of living of the parents are naturally the same for both siblings.
Also, in 61.23% of the families the education level of the siblings is the same, and in 46% of the families the
gender of the siblings are the same.




























0 50 100 150 200
distance between reference individual and parent
Cooperative, sister Cooperative, reference individual
Noncooperative, sister Noncooperative, reference individual


























0 50 100 150 200
distance between reference individual and parent
Cooperative, sister Cooperative, reference individual
Noncooperative, sister Noncooperative, reference individual


























0 50 100 150 200
distance between reference individual and parent
Cooperative, sister Cooperative, reference individual
Noncooperative, sister Noncooperative, reference individual
reference individual: high education, sister: medium education
34amount of care that these two sisters are providing to their parent, for diﬀerent geographical
distances of our reference individual.21 At the distance of 7.5 kilometers, both siblings have
exactly the same characteristics, and we see that they indeed give the same amount of care.
When the distance of our reference individual to the parent increases, the amount of care
provided by our reference sibling decreases, but the amount of care provided by her sister
increases (she compensates part of the loss of informal care). The total amount of informal
care provided is higher in the cooperative equilibria than in the noncooperative equilibria.
Compared to the situation where our reference person was an only child (p70 in ﬁgure 1), in
the noncooperative equilibria our reference person provides substantial less informal care.
In the second ﬁgure of 5 the sister of our reference person, explained above, has a high
education level instead of a medium education level (the two sisters still have the same wage
rate). In the presence of the high educated sister, our reference person provides more informal
care in the noncooperative equilibria than in the cooperative equilibria (until about 40 kilome-
ters), because she has a higher preference for informal care than her sister. When the reference
individual lives farther from their father, her high educated sister increases her provision of
informal care slightly.
When we switch the education levels for our reference person and her sister (such that the
reference person has a high education level and her sister has a medium education level), we
ﬁnd the equilibria shown in the third ﬁgure of 5. In the noncooperative equilibria the medium
educated sister provides most of the informal care, whereas in the cooperative equilibria informal
care is more shared between the reference individual and her sisters.
6.3 Interactions between siblings in SHARE
The simulations in the previous section showed us that the nature of the interactions between
children can have a large eﬀect on the division of informal care between siblings and the total
amount of informal care provided to parents. In this section we apply the estimated structural
model to families with two adult children in SHARE (described in section 4). First, we examine
the ﬁt of cooperative and noncooperative equilibria. Second, we investigate which siblings
behave cooperatively and noncooperatively (using observed characteristics). Finally, we study
21In section 5.2 we found that only those who have a relatively high unobserved random eﬀect for informal care
provide informal care. In ﬁgure 5 we therefore assume the sisters to have unobserved preferences for informal
care at the 70th percentile, corresponding to the line ‘p70’ in section 5 (30% of the of the adult children have a
higher random eﬀect us).
35the gains that can be achieved by cooperation.
To examine the ﬁt of cooperative and noncooperative equilibria we predict the cooperative
and noncooperative outcomes for the siblings in SHARE (using their observed characteristics
and the structural parameter estimates from the only child empirical results), and compare
them with their realized outcomes. Cooperative and noncooperative equilibria are described
by probabilities for each of the twelve alternatives described in section 3, for both siblings. We
examine the ﬁt of the cooperative and noncooperative equilibria by the sum (over siblings) of the
probabilities for the realized options, divided by the number of siblings. This can be interpreted
as the percentage of correct predictions of the model. The noncooperative model has a higher
ﬁt than the cooperative model (26.8% versus 17.3%). In the noncooperative model siblings
provide on average 1.13 hours of informal care per week, whereas in the cooperative model this
is 1.63 hours. The realized average hours of informal care is also closer to the noncooperative
outcome than to the cooperative outcome, namely 1.18 hours per week.
The next question we want to answer is which people tend to behave cooperatively and
which people tend to behave noncooperatively. We measure the degree of noncooperativeness
by the diﬀerence between the noncooperative and the cooperative predicted probabilities for
the realized outcome. Figure 6 shows the histogram of this measure of noncooperativeness and
can be interpreted as follows: when the degree of noncooperativeness is 0.1, the predicted prob-
ability for the observed outcome is 10%-points higher in the noncooperative model, compared
to the cooperative model. The histogram shows that for most of the families (71%) the pre-
dicted probability for the observed outcome is higher in the noncooperative model than in the
cooperative model (the noncooperative model has a better ﬁt). Even, for 47% of the families
the predicted probability for the observed outcome is more than 10%-points higher in the non-
cooperative model than in the cooperative model.22 The spike around zero includes families for
whom the cooperative and the noncooperative outcome are about the same.
22A sensitivity analysis shows that the conclusions are not very sensitive to the weights chosen in equation
(20). For example, when we choose the weights to be 0.3 and 0.7 (instead of 0.5 and 0.5) the ﬁt of the cooperative
model is 14.6% instead of 17.3%, the number of hours of informal care is 1.81 instead of 1.63, 75% of the families
have a better ﬁt for the noncooperative equilibrium (instead of 71%), and for 50% of the families the predicted
probability for the observed outcome is more than 10%-points higher in the noncooperative model than in the
cooperative model (instead of 47% when the weights are 0.5 and 0.5).
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Degree of noncooperativeness
We regress the degree of noncooperativeness on several background characteristics of the
siblings. The results in table 10 show that, relative to two sisters, the noncooperativeness of
two brothers is on average 10.5%-points higher (a 10.5%-points higher diﬀerence between the
predicted probabilities of the observed outcomes for the noncooperative and the cooperative
model). Also, a brother-sister relationship appears to be more cooperative than a brother-
brother relationship. This may be explained by the fact that traditionally women are kin
keepers. It has been found that sister-to-sister relationships and sister-to-brother relationships
show on average greater emotional closeness and more frequency of contact than brother-brother
relationships (Connidis and Campbell, 1995). Furthermore, when both of the siblings have a
high education level, or when one of them has a high education level and the other a medium
education level, they are signiﬁcant less cooperative than two medium or low educated siblings.
On average, relative to two low educated siblings, the noncooperativeness of two high educated
siblings is 3.2%-points higher. Finally, older siblings and siblings with a larger age diﬀerence
have a signiﬁcantly higher probability to behave cooperatively, and the diﬀerences in cooper-
ativeness between countries is small. Siblings in Austria and the Netherlands behave slightly
more cooperatively than siblings in Sweden, while siblings in Spain, Italy and Denmark behave
somewhat less cooperatively. In the results of table 10 the degree of noncooperativeness and
the preferences for informal care are separated by the assumption that diﬀerences in behavior
between children with and without siblings are due to dissimilar constraints only. For example,
table 10 shows that women are more cooperative than men, where we already take into account
37that women also have higher preferences for informal care than men (table 9). Also, for example,
wage rates are taken into account in the structural model, such that higher opportunity costs
resulting from higher wage rates of men can not explain the higher degree of noncooperativeness
of men compared to women.
To obtain insights in the gains that can be achieved from cooperation, we compute the
increase in the hours of informal care that would occur when those who seem to be noncooper-
ative would change to cooperative behavior. When those who tend to be noncooperative (they
have a higher probability to be noncooperative than to be cooperative) could be pushed into
cooperative behavior, their average provision of informal care would increase from 1.04 hours
per week to 1.52 hours per week. So, their parents would on average receive 0.96 hours of
informal care per week more from their children, which is a growth of 46.2%. While informal
care increases when families are pushed into their cooperative outcome, the number of persons
working full-time in the labor market decreases with 5.7%-points and the number of persons
working part-time increases with 6.7%-points.
38Table 10: Degree of noncooperativeness
Coef. Std. err. p-value
Gender
2 sisters 0.000 - -
brother and sister 0.020 0.004 0.00
2 brothers 0.105 0.005 0.00
Age
Age youngest sibling -0.004 0.000 0.00
Age diﬀerence between the siblings -0.002 0.001 0.00
Education
Both low education level -0.014 0.010 0.17
Both high education level 0.032 0.004 0.00
low and medium education level -0.018 0.008 0.02
low and high education level -0.006 0.015 0.67
medium and high education level 0.021 0.004 0.00
Number of children
Minimum number of children of both siblings -0.004 0.002 0.07
Diﬀerence in number of children between siblings 0.000 0.002 0.91
Partners
No partners 0.000 - -
One sibling has partner -0.004 0.009 0.63
Both siblings have a partner -0.006 0.009 0.53
Country of the parents
Sweden 0.000 - -
Austria -0.016 0.007 0.04
Belgium 0.001 0.007 0.85
Germany -0.012 0.007 0.08
Denmark 0.019 0.007 0.01
Spain 0.031 0.008 0.00
France 0.004 0.007 0.54
Italy 0.030 0.008 0.00
The Netherlands -0.019 0.007 0.01
Czechia -0.011 0.007 0.12
Greece -0.005 0.006 0.45
Poland 0.013 0.010 0.16




This study presents a structural model to analyze families’ complex decisions regarding informal
care provision for aging parents. In the model adult children maximize their utility, deﬁned over
consumption, leisure, and the amount of care that parents receive from their children, subject
to a time and budget constraint.
In the ﬁrst part of this paper the preference parameters of the model are estimated using only
children, such that interactions between siblings do not play a role. The results show that the
preference for informal care is inﬂuenced by the health of the parents, the gender and education
level of the adult children, and cultural and institutional diﬀerences between countries. Also
unobserved individual speciﬁc preferences such as altruism, reciprocity and responsibility norms
play a large role in the preferences of adult children to give informal care. The (negative) wage
elasticity of informal care supply appears to be small.
The second part of the paper focuses on the strategic interactions between siblings. In the
literature is has been emphasized that modeling family decisions as a bargaining process is
important to increase our understanding of these decisions. An important follow-up question is
whether this bargaining process is cooperative or noncooperative. In a structural model with
two siblings one has to make assumptions about the nature of the interactions between siblings.
When part of the siblings are cooperative and another part is noncooperative, this cannot be
identiﬁed in general together with the other coeﬃcients in a game-theoretic model. In some
way, one needs information about the (non)cooperativeness of siblings, which is often not avail-
able. Most often, empirical game-theoretic models assume that siblings make noncooperative
decisions. This study aims to establish the nature of the interactions between siblings using the
structural parameter estimates of only children. We show that the nature of the interactions
between siblings can have a large eﬀect on the division of informal care between siblings and
the total amount of informal care provided to parents. Furthermore, it appears that for 71%
of the siblings the noncooperative model has a better ﬁt than the cooperative model (which
means that the assumption of noncooperative siblings used by current game-theoretic models
is most likely for the majority of the siblings). The degree of cooperativeness varies most with
the gender of the siblings. The ﬁt of the noncooperative model compared to the cooperative
model is 10.5%-points higher for two brothers relatively to two sisters.
Furthermore, two high educated siblings or a high and medium educated sibling appear to
be less cooperative on average than two medium or low educated siblings, and older siblings
40have a signiﬁcant higher probability to behave cooperative.
For future research it may be interesting to estimate this model using U.S. data from the
Health and Retirement Study (HRS). The HRS has the advantage that it also contains infor-
mation about family income of the adult children.
For policy design we can conclude that a reduction in the geographical distance between
adult children and their parents would be an eﬀective measure to increase informal care as well
as the labor force participation of those children with a relatively high preference for informal
care. For example, the social rent sector could weigh informal care in their assignment of houses,
or senior houses could be built in residential areas. For ﬁscal policies it may be of interest that
net wages have negligible eﬀects on the provision of informal care, while they do inﬂuence
labor supply. Pushing noncooperative families into their cooperative equilibria would increase
the provision of informal care, but this would be at the expense of the labor supply of adult
children.
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46A Logit equilibrium
Section 6.1.1 explains the noncooperative logit equilibrium, which is a generalization of the
Nash equilibrium and deals with ‘noisy decisions’ made by bounded-rational siblings. This
equilibrium concept extends the model for only children described in section 3, to a game
theoretic framework with two players.
In section 6 we have two siblings, i and j who can choose between 12 alternatives. Therefore,
to obtain the logit equilibrium we have to solve a system of 24 nonlinear equations, the logit
response functions. The logit response functions of sibling i are
pi,1 =




m=1 U(ti,k|j = m)pj,m)
pi,2 =




m=1 U(ti,k|j = m)pj,m)
. . .
pi,12 =




m=1 U(ti,k|j = m)pj,m)
The logit response functions of sibling j are
pj,1 =




m=1 U(tj,k|i = m)pi,m)
pj,2 =




m=1 U(tj,k|i = m)pi,m)
. . .
pj,12 =




m=1 U(tj,k|i = m)pi,m)
These 24 equilibrium conditions have to be solved numerically since there is no closed-form
solution.
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